Citizenship Has Three Dimensions. Legal Citizenship Is Defined as
When the stakeholder principle mitigates disparity, it does not call into question the close link between rights, citizenship, territory and authority. For some, it is precisely this association that must be called into question, because it contradicts the growing fluidity of relations between individuals and communities in a globalized world. It is believed that this context requires more than a friendly change in the current principles of citizenship distribution: it requires the separation of the rights commonly associated with citizenship from the legal status of the citizen. [26] It is believed that this process has already begun in today`s democracies, since, as mentioned above, many of the civil and social rights associated with citizenship are now extended to all people living in the state, regardless of their legal status. The political right to participate should also be extended to resident non-citizens, perhaps even to “non-residents who have fundamental interests affected by a particular state” (Song 2009). In particular, the debate on the right to vote is complex and includes both external voting (extension of the right to vote to non-resident citizens) and internal voting (extension of the right to vote to non-resident citizens). Theorists who favor the thesis of social belonging (arguing that staying in a particular area over time is the key to belonging to a society) or the conception of citizenship by interest groups generally believe that long-term residence in a country should be the basis for granting democratic rights. The argument may include not only migrants who are entitled to permanent resident status, but also those who have entered the country illegally (Carens 2010b, 2013), as well as temporary migrants, particularly “guest workers” who are often denied access to citizenship (Lenard 2015). From this point of view, security against expulsion and the right to State protection abroad distinguish citizens from resident non-citizens. Citizenship rights are understood as extraterritorial (“they follow the citizen rather than the territory”), while the right to vote is better understood as territorial (Lenard 2015, 131). [27] When we are part of a community, we can influence it, participate in its development and contribute to its well-being.
Therefore, citizenship is also understood as a practice – the practice of playing an active role in our society. Such participation can take place in our neighborhood, in a formal or informal social group, in our country or around the world. The concept of active citizenship involves working to improve one`s own community through participation in order to improve the lives of all members of the community. Democratic citizenship is a closely related concept that emphasizes the belief that citizenship should be based on democratic principles and values such as pluralism, respect for human dignity and the rule of law. Discussions about citizenship usually have one of two models: Republican or Liberal. The sources of the republican model can be found in the writings of authors such as Aristotle, Tacitus, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington and Rousseau, as well as in different historical experiences: from Athenian democracy and republican Rome to Italian city-states and workers` councils. Citizenship is a complex and multidimensional reality that must be placed in its political and historical context. Democratic citizenship refers in particular to the active participation of individuals in the system of rights and duties, which is the lot of citizens in democratic societies.
Consultation meeting for the Council of Europe`s Education for Democratic Citizenship programme, 1996 Responding to these requests by simply reaffirming the ideal of shared citizenship is not a serious option. It can only exacerbate the alienation of members of these groups and lead to more radical political projects, including secession. To say that the recognition of self-government rights can weaken the ties of the community at large also means to assume that these ties exist and that a significant portion of national minorities identify with society as a whole. But such assumptions are often overly optimistic. If these links do not exist or remain weak enough, it is necessary to build a real dialogue between majority society and minorities on what constitutes just relationships through which differences can be recognized. The hope is that such a dialogue will strengthen rather than weaken their relations by placing them on a more solid moral and political basis (Carens 2000, 197). Critics have argued that the model proves exclusionary when universal citizenship is interpreted as requiring (a) the transcendence of certain perspectives to arrive at a common and general point of view, and (b) the formulation of laws and policies blind to difference (Young 1989). The first requirement seems particularly abhorrent once the general public is exposed as a myth that covers the culture and conventions of the majority. The call to overcome particularity too often leads to minorities being forced to move towards the majority. The second requirement may lead to more inequality rather than less, as the so-called neutrality of institutions blind to difference often refutes an implicit bias against the needs, interests and identities of the majority group. This bias often leads to specific burdens for members of minorities, i.e.
more inequality. National Socialism, the German variant of twentieth-century fascism, classified the country`s inhabitants into three broad hierarchical categories, each with different rights in relation to the state: citizens, subjects, and foreigners. The first category, citizens, should have all civil rights and obligations. Citizenship was granted only to men of German (or so-called “Aryan”) origin who had performed their military service and could be revoked by the state at any time. The Reich Citizenship Act of 1935 established racial criteria for citizenship in the German Reich, and because of this law, Jews and others who could not “prove” German racial heritage were stripped of their citizenship. [38] There are different versions of this thin understanding of the nation. What they all have in common is the trivialization of the commonalities of ancestry, culture and religion in favor of political and legal principles and institutions. [16] Nevertheless, there are variations: David Miller defends a concept of public culture that goes beyond politics to cover social norms (such as honesty in filing tax returns) and may encompass certain cultural ideals (for example, “religious beliefs or the obligation to preserve the purity of the national language” (Miller 1995, 26)), while Kymlicka argues that a thin corresponding conception of the nation also rejects assumptions, that “the members of the nation do the same … Lifestyle” (Kymlicka 2003, 273).